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Abstract
Understanding and analysing security risks is an essential task when designing and maintaining a systems’ security. The first risk
analysis should be performed during the system design. Identified risks have to be updated during the lifecycle when security
controls are implemented or new threats appear. Visualization facilitates the risk analysis process, but visualizing the huge
amount of risks with diverse causalities is challenging. This paper concentrates on risk visualization and related challenges. The
paper presents a semantic model for risk visualization and structuring implemented into the Metric Visualization System (MVS).
The proposed model and tool support make risk visualization consistent and ensures that it includes mutual connections of risks.
The contribution helps designers to analyse risks and to select security controls in a justified manner.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
Information visualization is a way to enhance our cognitive processing of abstract data with the help of computer-
generated, often interactive visual representations.1 Visualization facilitates the building of situational security
awareness. Simply put, situational awareness is being aware of what is happening around you and understanding
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what that information means for you now and in the future2. From this perspective, security visualization helps us
understand how security related events may affect the system under investigation.
This paper concentrates on challenges of visualising security risks by using the Metrics Visualization System
(MVS)3. Initially, the MVS was intended to be used for visualising security metrics. More information about the
MVS tool can be found from previous publications4,3.
Systems’ overall security is a composition of dozens of factors. Even for professional security experts, it is a
challenge to understand all of the data and its relationships. Moreover, various granularity options and views for
security related data are needed. For example, separate views to analyse a risk’s consequences versus its symptoms
are beneficial. Risk identification can produce a huge set of risks. Some of these are closely related to each other,
whereas some are more independent. Thus, it is a challenge to move from risks to appropriate countermeasures in a
uniform way. In this paper, we concentrate on how risk visualization can be made in a user-friendly way, and offer a
machine readable presentation of risks by means of a semantic risk model.
The paper makes the following contributions: i) challenges related to risk visualization and modelling are
presented. ii) A risk model and structure for visualization is proposed. Hence, the visualization is not just a drawing
tool, instead the MVS is able to understand and show risks’ relations. The new model is strictly semantic and self-
explanatory for knowledge exchange purposes. Parts of the model can be altered, exchanged and reused for other
systems. The contribution makes it possible to recognize paths from high level risks to their root causes.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives background information and defines the terminology. Risk
visualizations are discussed in Section 3. Advantages and shortcomings are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions
close the paper.
2. Background
Avižienis et al. define security as the composition of confidentiality, integrity and availability5. Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability are called security objectives, which form the CIA triad. In a risk analysis, risks for the
system are recognised. Risk combines the probability of threat realisation and the impact of the threat realization.
Based on risks, it is possible to make a justified selection of security objectives for the system. Security objectives
define a need for security controls to mitigate the recognised risks.
Security metrics are a holistic way to measure how effective and correct security controls are for mitigating risks.
Security is not a single attribute to measure, but the composition of security objectives, which require their own
metrics, and security controls, again with their own of metrics.
Information visualization makes the cognitive processing of abstract data easier by (1) allocating part of it to a
different part of the brain, i.e., the visual system, (2) reducing the need for searching, since information can be, e.g.,
grouped, (3) enhancing pattern recognition, (4) allowing perceptual inference, which can help us with problem
solving, (5) allowing perceptual monitoring, which is useful when one needs to react to events, and (6) allowing the
user to explore the data flexibly, when the visualization is interactive.1 Security visualization is a young sub-field of
information visualization. Traditionally, security visualization has focused on generating images from different
kinds of log records, which would be unwieldy for a human to process in textual form6. Even though there are lots
of tools for security visualization – e.g. the DAVIX7 toolkit alone contains over 30 tools for data analysis and
visualization – there is a dearth of security metric and risk visualization tools. The MVS was designed to fill this
gap.
The MVS is a tool for designing and monitoring the security of, primarily, information systems. It can be used to
visualize the security risks, objectives, controls and metrics identified for the system. The purpose of the MVS is to
help make the numerous security metrics needed to assess a system more approachable and meaningful. It provides
a high level perspective to the security state of the system during its operation, thus improving the situation
awareness of the user.
It is necessary to have a formal model to present risks, objectives, controls, security metrics, and mappings
between these concepts. The MVS has its own Ontology for Metrics Visualization System (OMVS) to contain these
objects and their relationships. The ontology itself is built on Resource Description Framework (RDF) using Turtle
notation, as it is a widely applied format that naturally resembles the MVS’ data structure. A clear standardisation
helps in preserving the capability of importing and exporting security data information to and from the model.
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When the user visualizes security with the MVS tool, the visualized data is formulated in the background into a
security metric model (SMM), which consists of security metric nodes (SMN). The MVS visualizes the model as a
tree-like graph. However, cyclical relationships are also supported due to the complex nature of security data. The
vertices of the graph represent the SMNs and the edges correspond to the relationships between the SMNs.
3. Visualization of risk analysis
3.1. Risk analysis case
We have performed a risk analysis for the MPY’s cloud-based elderly care service. The risk analysis was
performed during the design-time of the service. At the moment, the service is in the research and development
phase and has been evaluated with real users. It will be in commercial use later.
The service contains a set of monitoring sensors and a computer device. Sensors collect data from an elderly
person and their health. The computer collects the data and offers additional services to the customer, in order to
facilitate living at home as long as possible.
The risks analysis session contained a versatile group of experts with a business, customer, service development
and security background. Hence, risks were identified from various perspectives. The identified risks are listed in
Table 1.  Here, ‘R’ denotes “Risk arising from”, since a heterogeneous group produces a risk list that also contains
vulnerabilities and attacks. Next, the risks are analysed by assigning severity (S) and probability (P) values for each
risk – in this case, we applied three categories (1-3), where 1 denotes a small probability or severity.
3.2. Challenges in risk visualization
In order to define security objectives and countermeasures for the system, it is necessary to analyse
interdependencies and mutual effects of risks. It is not reasonable to define an individual security countermeasure
for each risk. Risk visualization facilitates the recognition of interdependencies, which in turn makes it possible to
select countermeasures that mitigate several risks at the same time.
Table 1. Identified risks for the example case
ID Description S P  ID Description S  P
1 R network failure 3 3  21 R service installation problems 2  1
2 R DoS attack 3 3  22 R human errors 2  3
3 Lost reputation 3 3  23 R usability problems 1  3
4 R power failure 3 3  24 R improper access control 2  1
5 R server availability 3 2  25 R authentication problems 2  1
6 R cooling problems 3 3  26 Ordering wrong service or accidentally ordered service 1 3
7 R Infrastructure problems 3 3  27 Wrong medication 2  3
8 R viruses / malware 3 2  28 R wrong use of devices 1  3
9 R updates 2 3  29 Death 3  1
10 R disturbance 3 2  30 User falls sick (or injury) due to the system 3  1
11 R configuration error 2 3  31 Fire 3  1
12 R default passwords 1 3  32 R physical access to devices 2  1
13 R data integrity 2 2  33 R the customer feedback system 2  2
14 R empty batteries 2 2  34 MPY delivers wrong information 2  2
15 R vulnerabilities, bugs or faulty components 2 3  35 Information disclosure (hacking or accident) 2  1
16 R quality variations 1 3  36 Confusions in payments 2  1
17 R cyber attack 3 1  37 R interfaces in the complex system 1  2
18 R device unreliability 2 2  38 Identity theft 3  1
19 R implementers’ know-how 1 2  39 Near relatives misuse the system 2  1
20 Ordered service is not delivered 2 1  40 Misusing drug orders 1  2
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Figure 1 was created with a general office tool during the interdependency analysis of risks. The colours denote
severity  and  probability  levels:  green  =  1,  yellow  =  2  and  red  =  3.  The  purpose  of  the  figure  is  to  illustrate  the
complexity of risk visualization: several connections exist and it is difficult to include all connections without
sacrificing  readability.  For  the  sake  of  comparison,  Figure  2  shows a  subset  of  the  same risks  visualized  with  the
MVS.
Using general office tools is easy, but everyone has their own way of presenting the problem, and often the
resulting figure is created for one particular purpose – re-use and sharing are not a priority. A figure like this is also
static. For example, if one is only interested in a subset of the risks at a time, there is no convenient way to hide the
rest.
After the risks have been organized and visualized, we can start defining the security controls and objectives. The
effectiveness of the controls may be validated by using security metrics. These additional layers of complexity can
also be more easily understood through visualization.
Figure 1. Risk visualization for the example case made using Microsoft Office Visio.
Figure 2. Subset of risks from the example case visualized with the MVS.
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3.3. Model and tool support for risk visualization
In comparison to the general office tools, using the MVS is much more uniform: one has predefined options in
how they can present the risks. Thus, everyone ends up with similar visualizations for similar situations. Re-use and
sharing of the resulting models have also been design goals for the MVS.
Figure 3 illustrates the desired features that we have identified for the MVS. Firstly, the user should be able to
visualize the security risks, objectives, controls and metrics of the system. Secondly, it should be easy for the user to
find the security objectives and controls relating to a particular risk, as well as the security metrics relating to a
particular security control.
With the MVS, we would like to eventually be able to offer different views that are linked to each other. The
leftmost panel in Figure 3 depicts a risk view, and the user should be able to easily access the underlying
objective/control model, shown in the middle panel. The metric model at the bottom of the hierarchy, depicted in the
rightmost panel, should be similarly accessible.
The amount of data in each viewpoint is an obvious visualization problem. If the model structure is simple, each
view becomes pointlessly sparse. A greater problem, however, is having too much content to display conveniently.
In the MVS, this problem is solved by using folding and zooming options.
The ideal structure for the security metrics is a tree – as shown in earlier security metrics decompositions8. In
practice, there are measurements that can be used to derive several other metrics, and as can be seen in Figures 1 and
2, the risks tend to have a great deal of interconnections. However, the tree structure is still a useful starting point.
After the structure of the model has been established, the next step in using the MVS is to introduce security
measurements and their meaningfulness. Currently, the node values in the MVS must be normalised to a range from
0 to 1. During run-time use of the MVS, the node values can be visualized with a traffic-light colour scheme. The
nodes in the MVS also have a confidence value, which is the model designer’s heuristic estimation for the quality of
a node. It also has the potential to be used as a weight parameter for calculating the values of derived metrics.
Currently,  the  value  of  a  parent  node  is  the  mean  of  the  values  of  its  child  nodes,  unless  the  user  has  specified
otherwise.
4. Discussion
The MVS is a work-in-progress; hence there are a great deal of features and tweaks that we still want to
implement. There are also some challenges that need to be properly addressed, before the MVS could be put to
commercial use.
The integrity of the model is imperative. Even though glitches in the visualization are severe faults, they are not
as fatal as the corruption of the model. Failures external to the model are probabilistic: when the model is
Figure 3. The leftmost panel shows the risk view. A menu box allows navigation further into the model. The
middle panel shows the visualization after the user has selected to show the composition of risk R#2. The new
tree only shows the selected risk, security objectives related to it and the mitigating controls. Now, the user can
choose to show the composition of a control (C#1). The rightmost panel shows the control as the root node of a
tree of metrics (M#1 - M#5). Here, M#1 and M#2 are derived metrics, as they have child nodes. Metrics M#3 -
M#5 are base measurements, which have an original value, acquired, e.g., from measurement instruments.
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manipulated by various sources, like the user via the GUI or a measurement probe, the complexity increases, and the
probability of a successful individual operation decreases.
The MVS has a rather strong segregation between the model and the sources, which makes it different from a
plain visualization editor. The MVS relies on a mediator that manages a dynamic list of abstract sources and shields
the model from complexity. However, nothing can guarantee that even the first queued operation is successful.
Consequently, the odds for success for subsequent operations decreases, even in the case that each operation is
atomic. For example, if an operation in the queue is to delete a certain node, all following operations manipulating
that node are bound to fail. There are obvious exceptions to the atomicity, e.g., the deletion of a node that has child
nodes. Particularly, the queueing of a sequence of operations that must collectively either succeed or fail, instead of
a single operation, is not atomic. In a chain of requests to the model in a concurrent system, some operations may
fail due to race conditions or desynchronization between the view and the model. The MVS mitigates this problem
by offering an optional mechanism for manipulating all the properties of a single node in an atomic manner.
The structure of the model is important for implementing value adjustment computations: when a node value
changes, it may affect its direct parents. However, when a single measurement affects several derived metrics,
updates must be carried out in a proper order. Currently, the idea in the MVS is to clone nodes that have several
parents to the visualization, in order to keep the presentation a tree and to make the value calculations simpler.
Creating a new model from scratch would be time-consuming. Basic mechanisms such as authentication tend to
be the same. In the future, we are aiming for an MVS that allows reusing a snippet from a complete model, a
security metrics pattern, for new unrelated models. A library of such patterns would save time, prevent human
errors, and give a starting point for building a system-specific design. Reusability could also be used for knowledge
transfer. Other future improvements for the MVS include the linking of views, additional visualizations for the
different attributes of nodes and usability improvements. Exploring the potential of building a connection from a
risk tree to an attack tree would also be interesting.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a semantic model for risk visualization and structuring. The model is constructed
with the help of the MVS, a novel tool for security metrics modelling and visualization. Using the tool makes the
risk analysis process more consistent and enhances the information exchange between users or use cases.
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